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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, Chuck Wielgus, the Executive Director of USA Swim-
ming, was voted into the International Swimming Hall of Fame
(ISHOF).1 In the months leading up to the formal induction cere-
mony, the Women’s Sports Foundation (WSF) spoke out against his
nomination, and submitted materials to the ISHOF board, pointing
to his numerous efforts to cover up instances of sexual abuse within
USA Swimming during his seventeen-year tenure as executive
director.2 One former swimmer reported that she was molested by
her coach when she was fourteen in 2008 and 2009.3 Wielgus had
the necessary means of preventing the abuse as early as 2003,4 but
instead, he ordered complaints filed against the coach be kept confi-
dential.5 Later in 2010, Wielgus reported to ESPN that the coach in
question was not “on USA Swimming’s radar” until he was arrested
in 2009.6 Wielgus alluded that such reports were merely rumors and
that he did not intend to “engage in [speculation].” 7
Representing nineteen victims of coaching sexual assault, the
Women’s Sports Foundation’s petition to the ISHOF read,
[M]ore than 100 USA Swimming coaches have been banned for life,
making this one of the worst sexual abuse scandals in the U.S.
Olympics sports world. . . . Many of these coaches had well-known,
long histories of sexual abuse, yet Wielgus enabled these men to
continue to coach for years. . . . He has not been a leader in protect-
ing victims; he has instead responded to outside pressure, and
only after other avenues of obfuscation have been exhausted.8
1. ISHOF Reviewing Protest Letter Against Chuck Wielgus Induction From Sexual
Abuse Victims, SWIMMING WORLD, (May 29, 2014, 3:12 PM), https://www.swimming
worldmagazine.com/news/ishof-reviewing-protest-letter-against-chuck-wielgus-induction
-from-sexual-abuse-victims [http://perma.cc/U2SV5XMZ].
2. Kelly Whiteside, Hall of Fame Rescinds Chuck Wielgus’ Invite Amid Sexual Abuse
Allegations, USA TODAY, (June 3, 2014, 10:23 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports
/olympics/2014/06/02/chuck-wielgus-usa-swimming-hall-of-fame/9893275 [http://perma
.cc/CYJ7P8WJ].
3. 19 Victims of Coaching Sexual Abuse, Rescind Chuck Wielgus’ Hall of Fame
Nomination, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/bruce-wigo-rescind-chuck-wielgus
-hall-of-fame-nomination [http://perma.cc/U2XELXG2].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Rachel Sturtz, The Sex Abuse Scandal Plaguing USA Swimming, OUTSIDE
ONLINE, (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.outsideonline.com/o/outdoor-adventure/water-activities
/swimming/The-Sex-Abuse-Scandal-Plaguing-USA-Swimming.html [http://perma.cc/ADQ
4CDEK].
8. Id. (brackets omitted).
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After five days of ardent protest led by the WSF,9 Wielgus re-
scinded his nomination and never got formally inducted into the
International Swimming Hall of Fame.10
Within the larger context of sexual abuse in Olympic sports,
Wielgus’ resignation represented a small, yet significant, victory for
Olympic athletes.11 The Wielgus anecdote is indicative of the larger
issue at play: Olympic athletes,12 mostly underage females,13 have
almost no effective grievance procedure within their own National
Governing Bodies (NGB), nor do they have statutory grounds for a
civil suit, to combat sexual abuse from coaches.14 Title IX protects
students from sexual harassment and assault by requiring educa-
tional institutions to address its occurrence,15 but Olympic athletes do
not fall within Title IX’s protection.16 Additionally, Title VII requires
employers to prevent harassment and also holds employers respon-
sible for other employees who create a hostile work environment.17
9. In their Change.org petition, the WSF and the nineteen victims made the follow-
ing claims: (1) Chuck Wielgus failed to remove known serial molesters from swimming,
(2) Chuck Wielgus did not demonstrate the necessary leadership to protect swimmers from
sexual harassment and abuse, the way students and employees are protected, (3) Chuck
Wielgus’s legislative strategy has been hostile toward victims that report sexual abuse, (4)
USA Swimming’s mandatory insurance policies made it unlikely victims would get the
counseling help they needed to move on with their lives, and (5) Chuck Wielgus has refused
to apologize to victims of sexual abuse. Victims of Coaching Sexual Abuse, Petition to Re-
move Chuck Wielgus from Swimming Hall of Fame, https://drive.google.com/folderview
?id=0B4Ya_nRTOEogQi0yaGNZc3Zod0k&usp=sharing [http://perma.cc/44T37N2N].
10. Whiteside, supra note 2.
11. Women’s Sports Foundation Facilitates Protest on Behalf of Victims of Sexual Abuse,
WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., (June 2, 2014), http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/en/home
/media-center-2/press-releases/press-release-June-2-2014 [http://perma.cc/R5784NPQ].
12. The United States Olympic Committee does not know exactly how many athletes
it serves. Many underage amateur athletes with Olympic potential practice under NGB-
sanctioned coaches without off icially being part of Team USA yet. See Donna Lopiano
& Connee Zotos, Athlete Welfare and Protection Policy Development in the USA, in SAFE-
GUARDING, CHILD PROTECTION AND ABUSE IN SPORT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES IN
RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRACTICE 97, 103 (Melanie Lang & Mike Hartill eds., 2015).
13. This Note will refer to perpetrators as male and victims/complainants as female.
While this author recognizes that there are exceptions, this paper primarily addresses
how the legal voids within the Sports Act affect female athletes.
14. Nancy Hogshead-Makar, Olympic Athletes Need Better Protections from Sexual
Harassment and Assault, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2012, 9:59 AM), https://www
.womenssportsfoundation.org/en/home/she-network/education/olympic-athletes-need
-better-protections-from-sexual-harassment-and-assault [http://perma.cc/U7S47S36].
15. Laura L. Dunn, Addressing Sexual Violence in Higher Education: Ensuring Com-
pliance with the Clery Act, Title IX and VAWA, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 563, 569 (2014)
(discussing schools’ obligations to respond to sexual harassment claims under Title IX).
See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1991) (holding that sexual
assault is a form of gender discrimination that invokes Title IX’s application), (remanded
to 959 F.2d 1022) (11th Cir. 1992).
16. Hogshead-Makar, supra note 14.
17. See id.
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However, Olympic athletes are not employees and therefore do not
trigger Title VII’s application.18
Though more efforts must be made, publicly removing Wielgus
from ISHOF signaled to the larger Olympic community the impor-
tance of leaders protecting victims, reinforcing a zero tolerance policy
for sexual abuse, and performing thorough investigations into sexual
abuse complaints.19 It also indicated that efforts leading up to the
Wielgus debacle to combat the issue had been minimal. In 2010,
before the Chuck Wielgus scandal, USA Swimming became the first
Olympic NGB to create a public list20 of coaches and officials who
have been banned either for making advances on their athletes or
having sexual contact with them.21 However, victims successfully
getting the NGB to ban a coach is still rare, and a coach is only
likely to get banned when a full criminal prosecution takes place.22
In response to the Chuck Wielgus and USA Swimming scandal,
leaders in the Olympic community have put forth new efforts to com-
bat the issue.23 In July 2015, the United States Olympic Committee
(USOC) “announced that it is developing a new agency [to investi-
gate sexual assault allegations],” 24 but advocates “are in the diffi-
cult position of waiting to see exactly what that means.” 25 Until the
USOC clarifies the scope and independence of its new agency,
sexual abuse in our national governing bodies will likely continue
without a mechanism for getting abusers out of sports.26
Additionally, the USOC adopted a strict policy prohibiting ro-
mantic and sexual relationships between coaches and athletes.27
18. Id.
19. Whiteside, supra note 2.
20. Sturtz, supra note 7; see Individuals Suspended or Ineligible—Permanently, USA
SWIMMING (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.usaswimming.org/ViewMiscArticle.aspx?TabId=19
63&mid=10011&ItemId=5107 [http://perma.cc/2FYZ7N5S].
21. See Sturtz, supra note 7 (discussing offenders like Andy King, a swimming coach
who coached several club teams, raped dozens of girls, and impregnated one. Sturtz also
mentions Charles Arabas, a swimming coach that has actually served a prison sentence
for his crimes. Arabas was fired from a coaching position for raping and sexually harassing
minor athletes. After, he moved to northern Arizona and assaulted seven more girls on his
new club team before f inally being prosecuted for his crimes).
22. See id.
23. See id. (noting that coaching sexual assault happens across all Olympic sports,
but for some reason, USA swimming has been particularly “riddled with [it].” ).
24. Irvin Muchnick, Nancy Hogshead-Makar: Women’s Sports Advocates in “Difficult”
Wait-and-See Mode on Sex Abuse Oversight, CONCUSSION INC. (July 22, 2015), http://con
cussioninc.net/?p=10197 [http://perma.cc/2Y9DX3JM].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. United States Olympic Committee Coaching Ethics Code, TEAM USA, http://www
.teamusa.org/USA-Karate/Off icials-and-Coaches/Coaches-Resources/USOC-Coaching
-Ethics-Code [http://perma.cc/53P3FLK2].
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This policy against such relationships is addressed under the head-
ing “exploitive relationships,” 28 prohibiting coaches from engaging
in sexual or romantic relationships with athletes or other partici-
pants.29 The USOC justifies the policy by noting that the coach has
“evaluative, indirect authority,” 30 over the athletes, so such relation-
ships would likely “impair judgment.” 31 This policy strives to “safe-
guard the well-being of persons for whom [coaches] are responsible,
rather than for the benefit of those in power.” 32 However, this policy
is not enforced by the NGBs unless specifically adopted by the coach-
ing associations.33
This Note will explain that there are two fundamental issues
facing coaching sexual assault victims: (1) currently, there is not an
effective way within the USOC and its NGBs to remove abusive
coaches from sports, and (2) there is no viable cause of action under
the Ted Stevens Amateur Sports Act (the Sports Act) available to
victims to sue their NGBs for safe-harboring abusive coaches.34 Ul-
timately, this Note will argue that a truly independent agency is
needed to investigate sexual abuse allegations and remove abusers
from the sport. It will also argue that Congress must strengthen the
Sports Act so that there is a cause of action available to current
victims in civil court.
Part I will explain current and existing law relevant to the
athletic world. This section will deal with Title IX and explain how
it provides students and student-athletes protections against cam-
pus sexual assault, particularly when it comes to removing those
found to have committed sexual assault from campus. Part I will
also discuss the Sports Act and describe the processes established
in the Act for resolving controversies relating to participation and
eligibility for athletes and coaches.
Part II will address the legal voids the Sports Act creates for
athletes, and how the problem of sexual abuse illuminates these
deficiencies. In this section, this Note will examine how the USOC
policy toward sexual abuse is fragmented. Additionally, this part
will point out other problems that compound the policy issue, such
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Nancy Hogshead-Makar, The Ethics of Title IX and Gender Equity for Coaches:
Selected Topics, in THE ETHICS OF COACHING SPORTS: MORAL SOCIAL AND LEGAL ISSUES
193, 204 (Robert L. Simon ed., 2013).
33. Id. at 204.
34. As will be discussed later, the Sports Act grants USOC exclusive jurisdiction re-
garding athletes’ eligibility and participation claims.
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as how some abusive coaches have evaded law enforcement and
criminal prosecution. Lastly, this Note will address how the Sports
Act precludes productive remedies for victims of coaching abuse in
two ways: (1) the Act lacks a cause of action allowing victims to pur-
sue private causes of action against NGBs for their own intentional
or negligent conduct in hiring or retaining abusive coaches within
NGB membership, and (2) the current internal NGB grievance pro-
cedure fails to remove abusers without a criminal conviction from
sports. Comparisons will be drawn to Title IX to illustrate exactly
where the cause of action is lacking. This section will also explain
that, even without a private cause of action, NGBs sometimes tailor
captive insurance policies to exclude intentional torts, thus further
minimizing victim damages.
Part III will offer proposals to address the aforementioned issues.
First, it will suggest that an independent agency must be created to
investigate sexual assault allegations and initiate the necessary
steps to remove abusers from sports. Second, it will suggest that a
tort cause of action must be carved out from the Sports Act that will
encompass the USOC and NGBs and hold them civilly liable for
sexual abuse claims.
Some commentators have touched upon the relationship be-
tween the Sports Act and private right of action in state tort law,35
and others have made sexual assault a widespread discussion in
relation to Title IX.36 Despite one 2015 law review article discussing
the fairness of captive insurance policies,37 no article was found that
specifically examines the lack of legal recourse granted to amateur
female athletes seeking retribution for coaching sexual assault. A
few journalists and victims’ attorneys have confronted the matter,
taking special notice of the USOC’s reporting mechanisms, but ad-
vocates have yet to approach the academic sphere to propose policy
changes and a private cause of action under the Sports Act. This
paper intends to establish the first stepping stone to academic legal
advocacy on the topic.
I. CURRENT AND SUPPORTING LAW
Under the current legal regime, there are two sources of sports
law that are relevant to discussions of coaching sexual abuse: Title IX
35. Dionne L. Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices Athletes’ Consti-
tutional Rights in the Pursuit of National Prestige, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1465, 1484 (2008).
36. Dunn, supra note 15, at 569.
37. John S. Carroll, Comment, Captive Insurance Companies and Sexual Abuse Policies,
84 UMKC L. REV. 211, 212 (2015).
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of the 1972 Education Amendments and the Ted Stevens Olympic
and Amateur Sports Act. Though Title IX only applies to educational
institutions receiving federal funding,38 it serves as a backdrop for
how a similar legal framework can apply to the Sports Act. Addition-
ally, the Sports Act outlines a dispute resolution process for claims
arising from athletes’ eligibility to participate in Olympic NGBs.39
However, as later sections will articulate, it does little to provide
remedies for victims of coaching sexual abuse.40 This part will
describe the current law and how it is applied to explain the legal
voids that facilitate abuse.
A. Title IX Is a Model for Providing Victims of Sexual Abuse With
a Range of Protections from Schools
Understanding how the Title IX legal framework addresses
sexual assault will establish a foundation for eliminating coaching
sexual abuse in Olympic Sports. Title IX empowered women’s equal
opportunity in education, and consequently, the professional world.41
The Amendment states, “No person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . .” 42
Title IX is probably best known for its protection of women’s
equal opportunity in athletics, but it also provides women and girls
affiliated with public colleges and universities restitution for sexual
assault on school campuses.43 Title IX addresses sexual assault as
a civil rights violation and protects all students pursuing their
education at public colleges and universities.44 Sexual violence also
occurs in other sport contexts such as at the collegiate level where
38. Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (Westlaw through
Pub. L. No. 114-219).
39. See Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C.A. § 220509 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114
-218).
40. See infra Part II.
41. Susan Reichle, Title IX Creates Opportunities for Women in Sports and Develop-
ment, USAID (June 26, 2012), https://blog.usaid.gov/2012/06/title-ix-creates-opportu
nities-for-women-in-sports-and-development [http://perma.cc/C98KLGBN].
42. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
43. According to the Department of Education, “Young women aged 16–24 experience
the highest rates of rape and sexual assault, while 1 in 5 will be a victim of sexual assault
during college.” Vice President Biden Announces New Administration Effort to Help
Nation’s Schools Address Sexual Violence, OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/vice-president-biden-announces-new-administra
tion-effort-help-nations-schools-ad [http://perma.cc/US69GGSA].
44. Dunn, supra note 15, at 568.
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many high-profile campus rape cases have involved student-athletes
as both alleged perpetrators and victims.45
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX by defining
sexual harassment as a form of gender discrimination.46 As a sup-
plement to the case law controlling Title IX’s application to sexual
violence, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) released a Revised Sexual
Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,
Other Students, or Third Parties (2001).47 In 2011, the OCR published
the “Dear Colleague Letter” (DCL) to provide further guidance for
schools handling sexual violence on campus.48 Under these provi-
sions, a campus rape victim has different options for action. They
include: invoking a school’s administrative hearing procedure, re-
porting to the police, submitting a complaint to an administrative
agency like the OCR, or filing a civil cause of action against the
school if it had notice and remained deliberately indifferent.49
Because Title IX protects students in all activities related to
schools’ educational programs, the DCL instructs schools to respond
to all instances of sexual harassment and violence.50 When respond-
ing, schools must adhere to specific procedural requirements.51 They
include: disseminating a notice of nondiscrimination, designating
one employee as a Title IX coordinator, and adopting and publishing
“grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution
of student and employee sex discrimination complaints.” 52
For Title IX purposes, an investigation into a sexual assault
complaint is a “decision-making process [a] school uses to determine:
(1) whether or not the [alleged] conduct occurred; and, (2) if the [act
did occur], what actions the school will take to end sexual violence,
45. See Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007) (ruling against
the University of Georgia for admitting a student-athlete that went on to rape a fellow
student, despite previous knowledge that he was removed from other colleges for harassing
women), declined to follow by, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77888); see also Jennings v. Univ.
of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 691 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing whether two female
student-athletes were entitled to damages after their coach violated Title IX by sexually
harassing them).
46. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 60, 76 (1991) (holding that
Title IX does provide a remedy for students experiencing sexual harassment from school
officials).
47. Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Em-
ployees, Other Students, or Third Parties, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.
(Jan. 2001), http://www2.ed.gov/about/off ices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf.
48. Russlynn Ali, Dear Colleague Letter, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC. 1, 2 (2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/off ices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf.
49. Id. at 2–3, 10, 19.
50. Id. at 3–4.
51. Id. at 4.
52. Id. at 6.
2016] LICENSE TO ABUSE 149
eliminate the hostile environment, and prevent its recurrence . . . .” 53
The OCR also requires that Title IX investigations be “adequate,
reliable . . . impartial [and] . . . prompt . . . .” 54 Throughout the
investigation, the university must afford both parties the “equal op-
portunity to present relevant witnesses and other evidence.” 55 Addi-
tionally, if the school permits one party to have lawyers or an appeal,
it must do so for both parties.56
Title IX sexual assault investigations may also intersect with a
local criminal investigation.57 While a school has a duty to conduct
its own thorough investigation of a sexual assault complaint,58 it is
also required to notify the complaining student of his or her right to
file a criminal complaint and should not discourage a student from
doing so.59 As a whole, the DCL investigation requirements incentiv-
ize schools to make specific and sound polices toward investigating
and preventing sexual assault on campus.60 By incorporating consis-
tent and clear policy, schools are in an appropriate position to miti-
gate disruptions in potential victims’ and perpetrators’ education.61
As will be discussed later, the Sports Act does not offer amateur
athletes the same protections that Title IX provides students; and
yet, both statutes cover different groups of vulnerable individuals.
Particularly, coach-inflicted sexual assault involves similar issues
found in campus sexual assault investigations, such as how to effec-
tively remove perpetrators and provide victims a productive mecha-
nism for reporting abuse.62 The following subsection will outline, in
contrast to Title IX, the mechanism current Olympic athletes have
and its potential pitfalls.
53. Russlynn Ali, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, OFFICE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 1, 24–25 (2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/off ices
/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf.
54. Id. at 12.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 27.
58. Ali, supra note 48, at 4.
59. Id. at 10.
60. Nick Rammell, Comment, Title IX and the Dear Colleague Letter: An Ounce of
Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure, 2014 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 135, 139–40 (2014) (dis-
cussing how CU Boulder could have behaved more preventatively given that it had prior
notice of sexual discrimination in their recruiting program, including a Sports Illustrated
article, knowledge of prior sexual assaults within the football recruiting program, and
discussion with local law enforcement).
61. Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 221, 222 (2015) (arguing that characterizing rape as a civil wrong will make it more
likely for the DOE to succeed in reducing the amount of nonconsensual sex taking place
on college and university campuses).
62. Id. at 232, 235 (explaining that very few reports of sexual assault on college cam-
puses result in charges).
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B. The Sports Act’s Dispute Resolution Process Only Implicates the
Grievances That Directly Affect an Athlete’s Eligibility and Ability
to Compete
While Title IX provides remedies for students and student-
athletes experiencing sexual assault, the Sports Act only implicates
athletes seeking solutions to issues affecting their ability to participate
in competition.63 Congress originally passed the Sports Act as a re-
sponse to the lack of organizational structure in the American Olympic
Sports program.64 Without a governance structure, American Olym-
pic officials engaged in intra-organizational political “squabbles.” 65
As a result, the Olympic governing bodies neglected their sporting
associations by focusing on intra-organizational disputes rather
than on training their athletes to compete at the Olympic level.66 In
response to these issues, Congress passed the Sports Act in 1978
and instilled in the USOC the necessary powers to govern American
Olympic sports.67
In 1998, Congress passed an amended version of the act, this
time providing athletes with some power to conduct dispute resolu-
tion within their NGBs.68 However, there are two reasons it is difficult
for an athlete to pursue relief for an issue inhibiting her ability to
participate: (1) an athlete has no federal constitutional right to par-
ticipate in Olympic sports,69 and (2) the Sports Act does not create
any substantive athletic participation rights that athletes can en-
force in private litigation against the USOC or an NGB.70 Courts
have also reinforced that Congress specifically granted the USOC
jurisdiction to make athlete eligibility determinations,71 and the
Sports Act only applies to very narrow questions of eligibility,72 such
as whether an athlete can continue competing after testing positive
for performance-enhancing drugs.73
63. 36 U.S.C.S. § 220503 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
64. James A.R. Nafziger, The Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 1983 BYU L. REV. 47, 47
(1983).
65. Id. at 49. n.15.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 50.
68. See 36 U.S.C.S. § 220509 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
69. See DeFrantz v. USOC, 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
70. Id. at 1191.
71. Id.
72. See Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Ath. Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 595 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
that “when it comes to challenging the eligibility determination of the USOC, only a very
specif ic claim will avoid the impediment to subject matter jurisdiction that [the Sports
Act] poses.”).
73. Id. at 595–96.
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There are several components to the Sports Act’s legal frame-
work for Olympic participation. First, the USOC is required to have
an Athletes’ Advisory Council to represent athletes’ interests and
establish an open line of communication between athletes and the
USOC.74 U.S. athletes currently participating in international ama-
teur athletic competitions elect members to the Council.75 Athletes
also maintain voting power within the USOC; they must have at
least 20% of membership and voting power held by the USOC Board
of Directors,76 committees,77 and each NGB.78 Additionally, the NGB
is required to provide all amateur athletes with an equal opportunity
to participate “without discrimination on the basis of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, age, or national origin . . . .” 79
When problems arise with an athlete’s participation, the USOC
must enact some mechanism to resolve the dispute on its own, and
NGBs must initiate their own internal investigation.80 If an athlete
is not satisfied with the outcome of the investigation, he or she has
only one remaining available option: submit to a “final and binding
arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (‘AAA’).” 81 The proceeding takes place
between the athlete and the NGB;82 the AAA selects a single arbi-
trator or a panel of arbitrators to investigate a finding of fact and
conclusion of law to settle the dispute.83
Because arbitration awards are bound by AAA confidentiality
obligations, it is difficult to determine how effective the arbitration
requirement is for athletes seeking restitution for NGB action that
may inhibit their ability to participate.84 Additionally, even if a court
disagrees with the outcome of an arbitration proceeding,85 it will
74. 36 U.S.C.S. § 220504(b)(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-218).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 36 U.S.C.S. § 220504(b)(1) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-218).
79. 36 U.S.C.S. § 220522(a)(8) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-218).
80. Matthew J. Mitten, Legal Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities in the
United States of America, 19 NAT’L SPORTS L. INST. 1, 3 (2008), https://law.marquette.edu
/assets/sports-law/pdf/for-the-record/v19i4.pdf.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 4.
83. Id. at 4.
84. Id.
85. Arbitration in any context remains a controversial topic; in employment contracts,
arbitration seems to benefit the employer and place too many burdens on the complaining
party. See Eric Koplowitz, Note, “I Didn’t Agree to Arbitrate That!”—How Courts Determine
if Employees’ Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Claims Fall Within the Scope of
Broad Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 565, 570 (2012).
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apply very limited scrutiny to the AAA arbitration award.86 However,
a court will interfere with an arbitration outcome if the arbitrator
exceeded his authority, especially if the award is “the result of ‘corrup-
tion,’ ‘fraud,’ ‘evident partiality,’ or any similar bar to confirmation.” 87
Overall, arbitration is primarily intended to solve issues that
affect the athlete’s membership in the NGB, namely issues that
concern an athlete’s overall athletic eligibility.88 In that sense, athletes
face even more difficulty pursuing specific causes of action that may
indirectly affect their ability to compete, like sexual assault or sexual
harassment, against their respective NGBs.89 In these indirect
cases, it is difficult for an athlete to concretely say that her NGB is
keeping her from actively practicing and participating at an elite
level.90 Consequently, the Sports Act creates an exclusive and lim-
ited means for solving conflict arising from sports participation.
II. THE LEGAL VOID
As noted above, the Sports Act serves a broad purpose for all
Olympic athletes: establish a clear organizational structure for Olym-
pic sports, one that affords and protects an athlete’s opportunity to
participate and compete.91 While many athlete grievances can be
properly addressed, others carry long-lasting trauma for which arbi-
tration is not ideal.92 As a harm that cuts against a young woman’s
ability to effectively participate in Olympic sports, sexual assault pre-
sents similar issues to NGBs as it does to college administrations.
This part discusses three issues: (1) the USOC’s policy directed
toward abuse, especially when the abuse involves minors, is frag-
mented, (2) the Sports Act poses roadblocks to removing abusers
86. Mitten, supra note 80, at 4.
87. Id.
88. See Hogshead-Makar, supra note 14.
89. When an athlete’s claim does not directly involve her right to participate, she may
file a grievance pursuant to the NGB’s internal complaint procedures, which includes
discrimination claims. See Athlete Guide to Resolution of Olympic and Paralympic
Disputes, TEAM USA, http://www.teamusa.org/Athlete-Resources/Athlete-Ombudsman
/Dispute-Resolution [http://perma.cc/99359RLH].
90. This assumes that though sexual assault may disrupt an athlete’s experience, it
does not keep her from actually participating; therefore, an NGB may have more reason
to detach itself even from arbitration in a coaching sexual abuse proceeding. This argu-
ment, unique to this Note, is derived from the fact that the Amateur Sports Act does
have a non-discrimination clause (which would encompass sexual assault claims), but
the Act requires such claims to go through AAA arbitration rather than the court system.
See Hogshead-Makar, supra note 32, at 204.
91. See 36 U.S.C.A. § 220509 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
92. This point will be discussed more thoroughly further on in this section, and it will
use recent pleadings to show the difficulties victims’ lawyers face when confronting coach-
ing sexual abuse.
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from sports, and (3) there is no cause of action under the Sports Act
that victims can utilize against NGBs to win suitable damages for
experiencing coach-inflicted sexual assault.
A. Current USOC Policy Does Not Offer Victims Concrete Solutions
The separate entities involved—the USOC, NGBs, and club
teams—are not equipped to address abuse committed by a sanc-
tioned coach. As noted in the introduction, the USOC has a specific
ethics policy directed toward Olympic coaches: “Coaches do not engage
in sexual/romantic relationships with athletes or other participants
over whom the coach has evaluative, direct, or indirect authority,
because such relationships are likely to impair judgment or be
exploitative.” 93 Even prohibiting relationships with former athletes,
the USOC describes any kind of personal relationship between coach
and athlete as exploitative.94
Before 2012, NGBs were not required to adopt the minimum
policy standards set forth by the USOC.95 Victims faced other issues,
especially in USA Swimming, when reporting sexual abuse: the
NGB did not prohibit sexual touching in its code of conduct until
1999, nineteen years after the NGBs’ creation.96 Also, the NGB did
not require criminal background checks of coaches until 2006,97 and
it did not formulate a procedure for dealing with abuse allegations
until 2011.98 When victims did make allegations, reports went to a
National Board of Review hearing, as required by the Sports Act.99
In the USA Swimming context, hearings were typically chaired by
USA Swimming’s own legal counsel, thus violating the impartiality
requirement in the Sports Act.100
In 2012, USOC expanded its protection of athletes by requiring
NGBs to adopt an athlete welfare strategy.101 USOC outlined mini-
mum components that NGBs were required to adopt by December
2013.102 These components included:
93. United States Olympic Committee Coaching Ethics Code, supra note 27.
94. Id.
95. Hogshead-Makar, supra note 32, at 204.
96. Sturtz, supra note 7.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. However, in recent years, the panel has made more informed decisions about
banning a coach from sport after investigating an athlete’s allegation. Id.
101. Lopiano & Zotos, supra note 12, at 101.
102. Id. at 101–02.
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(1) A policy that prohibits bullying; hazing; harassment;
emotional, physical and sexual misconduct, including
child sexual abuse; and romantic or sexual relation-
ships between NGB [program] participants and coaches
or other supervisory personnel with direct supervisory
control, or who are in a position of power or trust, over
the participant.
(2) A requirement for “criminal background checks for
those individuals it formally authorizes, approves or
appoints (a) to a position of authority over, or (b) to
have frequent contact with athletes . . . .”
(3) Beginning 1 January 2014, implementation of edu-
cation and training concerning the key elements of
their safety [program] for those individuals it formally
authorizes, approves or appoints (a) to a position of
authority over, or (b) to have frequent contact with
athletes . . . .
(4) A procedure for reporting misconduct.
(5) A grievance process to address misconduct allegations
that have not been adjudicated under a criminal back-
ground check, and that includes the opportunity for
independent review.103
While the above policy seems progressive in its content, its
application is limited.104 NGBs are not required to extend further
protections to their athletes outside of the USOC’s minimal require-
ments.105 Additionally, only those working directly in an NGB are
subject to the policy, which means that NGBs are “not required to
extend the policy to local clubs or individual coaches outside NGB-
sponsored [programs], weakening the protection available.”106 The
USOC also concedes that it is unaware of how many NGB-affiliated
athletes it serves, but the “most recent USOC quadrennial census
report suggests there are 3,220,988 NGB-affiliated athletes.”107
103. Id. at 102 (citing to the United States Olympic Committee Coaching Ethics Code,
supra note 27).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. Technically, the policy only pertains to NGB employees, the athletes selected
by the NGBs, and individuals who the NGB formally authorizes to have direct interactions
with athletes. Clubs and coaches outside of NGB-sponsored programs may still be affiliated
with the NGB by training and preparing athletes that will funnel into the Olympic teams.
Lopiano, supra note 12, at 102. Additionally, NGBs like USA Swimming are notorious for
claiming that they are not responsible for coaching abuse taking place within club teams
because club teams are “self-run.” See Sturtz, supra note 7.
107. Lopiano & Zotos, supra note 12, at 103.
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At the NGB level, sporting organizations do not have an official
mechanism for keeping track of information concerning coaches that
are involved in pending criminal proceedings or civil lawsuits for
alleged abuse.108 Also, due to a lack of coordination, NGBs also fail
to alert other sporting organizations serving young Olympic hope-
fuls to these investigations.109 Donna Lopiano points out the gaping
issue here in her work about athlete welfare policy: a coach can
technically abuse an athlete at one club and leave either before the
abuse is detected or if the abuse is not reported to the police.110
Meanwhile, the abusing coach is free to coach at another club where
athletes are unaware of his abusive history.111
Compounding the policy issues, law enforcement cannot always
effectively remove abusers from sports, especially when an abusing
coach has a particularly close relationship with his athletes. Though
some abusive coaches have been prosecuted for their crimes,112
others evade detection, making it difficult for law enforcement to
take perpetrators into custody.113 The latter scenario happens when
an athlete spends significant time with her abusing coach.114 In
these situations, an athlete might not immediately recognize her
coach’s advances as abuse because the abuser is initiating a process
called “grooming.”115 Grooming proceeds through several stages:
targeting a victim, building trust with the victim, developing control
over the victim, initiating abuse, and securing secrecy.116 At this point,
abusers establish strong relationships with their victim-athletes,
making it less likely a victim will report the abuse, either to her
parents or law enforcement.117
These issues, namely the fragmented policies and abusers’ groom-
ing tactics, are best exemplified by the story of Anna Strzempko, an
accomplished swimmer and coaching abuse victim. At thirteen, Anna
made it to the finals of the 2008 YMCA Course National Champion-
ship, becoming the second female swimmer from the Greater Holyoke
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 103–04.
111. Id.
112. Some abusers, like Andy King, evaded police detection before ever being criminally
prosecuted for their crimes. See Megan Chuchmach & Avini Patel, ABC News Investigation:
USA Swimming Coaches Molested, Secretly Taped Dozens of Teen Swimmers, ABC NEWS
(Apr. 9, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/abc-news-investigation-usa-swimming
-coaches-raped-molested/story?id=10322469 [http://perma.cc/Y72Z2KFW].
113. See Lopiano & Zotos, supra note 12, at 104.
114. See Hogshead-Makar, supra note 32, at 203.
115. Harassment and Abuse in Sport, THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT (2015), http://www
.olympic.org/sha [http://perma.cc/E6TV5AVL].
116. Id.
117. See id.
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YMCA Vikings swim team to make it to that stage of competition.118
Afterward, Anna’s coach called her into his office to tell her she had
Olympic potential and then raped her in the storage room next to
his office.119 The abuse continued throughout Anna’s high school years,
and thinking no one would believe her if she said anything, she did
not report the abuse to her parents or any YMCA authority.120
Anna did finally report the abuse to her mother, but she only
told her mother bits and pieces of her story over the course of a few
months.121 Mrs. Strzempko reported the abuse to YMCA officials,
and the coach was suspended.122 Local police interviewed Anna and
later told her mother that she did not “ ‘act’ like an abuse victim.”123
The Strzempko family also reported the alleged abuse to the Massa-
chusetts Department of Children and Families.124 The agency ruled
in favor of Anna, but then backed off its initial decision and rein-
stated the coach when his lawyer attacked Anna’s credibility on
appeal.125 By 2013, the family decided to report the abuse to USA
Swimming, and after investigation, the NGB ultimately decided not
to change the coach’s status as a sanctioned coach in USA Swim-
ming.126 All the while, Anna and her family faced criticism through-
out the YMCA community for reporting a beloved coach; critics
typically accused Anna of seeking attention.127 Later in 2013, one of
Anna’s teammates tweeted, “no one believes you anyways you stupid
whore ).”128 Now in college, Anna still legally and emotionally bat-
tles the abuse she experienced throughout her teenage years.129
Anna’s story highlights Donna Lopiano’s main point about evolv-
ing athlete welfare policy: the measures aimed at protecting young
athletes in NGB-affiliated teams are too fragmented and attenuated
to provide proper remedies for coaching abuse victims.130 As a result,
victims like Anna are bound to meet resistance when they report
abuse to their local club teams and respective NGBs. Additionally,
as the next section will discuss, the legal recourse victims do have
when they report abuse does not always provide them with ade-
quate remedies.
118. Sturtz, supra note 7.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Sturtz, supra note 7.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Lopiano & Zotos, supra note 12, at 104.
2016] LICENSE TO ABUSE 157
B. The Sports Act Lacks a Clear Conflict Resolution Mechanism
for Coaching Sexual Assault Victims
While students and student-athletes have Title IX at their dis-
posal to hold schools accountable after they experience sexual as-
sault,131 club sport athletes132 are limited to the Sports Act.133 Though
the Sports Act provides arbitration for athletes alleging that the NGB
infringed upon their participation eligibility,134 it is not designed to
properly address sexual assault for two reasons: (1) the Sports Act’s
deference to the USOC’s and NGB’s internal grievance procedure
fails to remove abusers from sport, and (2) the Act does not contain
any provision that would create liability for NGBs that knowingly
retain abusers. This part will use a case currently pending litiga-
tion, Gatt v. USA Taekwondo,135 to illustrate athletes’ difficulties
when submitting to an internal grievance procedure and why the
current system keeps athletes from holding NGBs liable for abuse.
1. The Amateur Sports Act Cannot Effectively Remove
Coaches from Sports
As noted before, courts have ruled that the USOC’s adjudicatory
jurisdiction under the Sports Act should be narrowly construed to
matters directly affecting an athlete’s eligibility.136 When an ath-
lete’s grievance does not involve the denial of the right to compete in
protected competition, she may file a grievance pursuant to the
NGB’s internal complaint procedures.137 If the outcome is unfavorable
131. See supra text accompanying notes 43–47 (discussing legal recourse students
have under Title IX for campus sexual assault).
132. Amateur athletes are arguably more at risk than professional athletes. While pro-
fessional athletes are paid, amateur athletes are not and therefore cannot sue for sexual
harassment or assault under Title VII. See Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination
Questions and Answers, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Nov. 21, 2009), https://
www.eeoc.gov/facts/quanda.html [http://perma.cc/7ZAV22ML].
133. See supra text accompanying notes 64–67 (discussing why the Sports Act was
passed).
134. For amateur and professional sport-related claims under the Amateur Sports Act,
courts have little discretion for determining whether or not a claim falls within the man-
datory arbitration requirement. In order to compete, athletes are required to sign a form
agreeing to arbitration and to forego all lawsuits. Jason Gubi, Note, The Olympic Binding
Arbitration Clause and the Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Analysis of Due Process
Concerns, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 997, 998 (2008).
135. I have received permission from an attorney aff iliated with the plaintiff’s case to
cite his pleadings in this Note. At this point, the coach has been criminally convicted, so
the facts of the case have already been recorded on public record.
136. Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 595 (7th Cir. 2001).
137. Athlete Guide to Resolution of Olympic and Paralympic Disputes, supra note 89.
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to her, she may submit the complaint to AAA arbitration.138 Conse-
quently, athletes bringing complaints that indirectly affect their
participation, like those requesting to remove certain coaches for
abuse allegations, run into additional challenges.139 As discussed
below, the reasons that athletes face difficulty removing abusers
from sport are: (1) the internal NGB grievance procedure raises sig-
nificant partiality concerns, and (2) arbitration, as the mechanism
for appealing decisions made outside of the athlete’s favor, is not
suitable for sexual assault claims.
The Sports Act provides for two procedural pathways for filing
a complaint within the NGB: informal resolution and formal resolu-
tion.140 An informal resolution process includes “direct conversation/
negotiation with the NGB . . . and/or mediation assistance from the
Athlete Ombudsman.”141 Athletes submitting complaints through a
formal process go through a more in-depth procedure.142 As a vio-
lation of the code of conduct, sexual assault is classified as “[o]ther”
on the USOC’s list of complaints.143 When submitting these com-
plaints through a formal process, the athlete must submit it to her
NGB’s Grievance Procedure.144 If she does not achieve the preferred
outcome, her only recourse is to appeal to arbitration.145
At the NGB Internal Grievance stage, there are significant
issues with partiality, namely a lack of incentive to remove abusers
and a conflict of interest, as demonstrated by a recent case, Gatt v.
USA Taekwondo.146 This case demonstrates how the NGB internal
grievance procedures fail victims and involves USA Taekwondo
(USAT) and Marc Gitelman, a Taekwondo coach who molested three
underage female athletes on separate occasions from 2007 until he
was arrested in 2014.147
138. Id.
139. The Amateur Sports Act requires Olympic NGBs to provide all amateur athletes
with an equal opportunity to participate “without discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, age, or national origin . . . .” 36 U.S.C.A. § 220522(a)(8) (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 114-218). Additionally, an NGB must “encourage and support athletic participation
opportunities for women . . . .” Mitten, supra note 80, at 3. These requirements imply
that NGBs are required to provide meaningful participation opportunities, and this Note
assumes that allowing an abuser to continue coaching detracts from the meaningfulness
of his athletes’ opportunities.
140. Athlete Guide to Resolution of Olympic and Paralympic Disputes, supra note 89.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. See Compl. for Damages ¶¶ 24–25, Gatt v. USA Taekwondo, No. BC599321,
(Oct. 29, 2015).
147. See id. ¶¶ 21–25.
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In September 2013, Yazmin Brown, one of the three athletes,
filed a formal complaint with the USA Taekwondo Ethics Commit-
tee.148 The complaint went to Malia Arrington,149 the Director of
Ethics and “SafeSport” for defendant USOC.150 As the Director of
Ethics, Arrington is responsible for enforcing the USOC’s Code of
Conduct, which prohibits “any act of sexual harassment including
but not limited to requests for sexual favors, physical conduct of a
sexual nature by and between persons participating in the affairs or
activities of USAT directed towards any other member or person
participating in such events/activities . . . .”151 Brown submitted
Facebook conversations she had with Gitelman, outlining the exten-
sive sexual relationship he pursued with her while she was a minor.152
The two other women listed in the complaint also submitted narra-
tives outlining their own similar experiences with the coach.153 De-
spite this evidence, the Ethics Committee did not strip Gitelman of
his status as a USAT coach until he was arrested in 2014 on child
molestation charges.154
In October 2015, the three women filed suit against USA
Taekwondo and the USOC for harboring Gitelman and failing to
remove him from USAT when he was initially reported.155 The com-
plaint alleges that before the three women filed suit, the USOC had
been on notice about abuse taking place within its training facilities
since the 1980s.156 Specifically, the complaint points to 2005 when
a USAT athlete was raped at the Olympic Training Center in Colo-
rado Springs.157 “In response to that rape defendant USOC placed
a guard outside the girls dormitory at its training center in Colorado
Springs however, that guard was removed sometime between 2005
and 2009.”158
The Ethics Committee’s decision not to remove the USA Tae-
kwondo coach is arguably indicative of the larger crisis: that NGBs
148. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Little, Partner, Saeed & Little, LLP (Feb. 28,
2016).
149. See Compl. for Damages, supra note 146, ¶ 9.
150. Vanessa Kirbitsky, U.S. Olympic Committee Name Malia Arrington Director of
Ethics and Safe Sport, TEAM USA (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.teamusa.org/Media/News
/USOC/US-Olympic-Committee-names-Malia-Arrington-Director-of-Ethics-and-Safe
-Sport [http://perma.cc/BG5J48ST].
151. See Compl. for Damages, supra note 146, ¶ 17.
152. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Little, Partner, Saeed & Little, LLP (Feb. 28,
2016).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Compl. for Damages, supra note 146, ¶ 25.
156. Id. ¶ 34.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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might be protecting their coaches at the expense of their athletes’
safety. Similar occurrences have taken place in other NGBs such as
USA Fencing, Swimming, Biathlon, and Field Hockey, to name a
few.159 In USA Swimming, for example, an athlete submits a com-
plaint to the National Board of Review.160 The Board is responsible
for “resolv[ing] matters, questions and disputes involving USA Swim-
ming, the Local Swimming Committees, or the membership.”161 In
theory, when an athlete reports sexual misconduct, the matter must
go straight to the Board and is adjudicated by a panel of impartial
committee members.162 In practice, the committee often has been
chaired by USA Swimming’s own legal counsel.163 This meant that
the lawyer who was supposed to be the impartial adjudicator could
also be the same lawyer who becomes adversarial to the athlete if
the matter reaches a courtroom.164
The Taekwondo athletes’ choice to file suit is revealing of the
second issue with the NGB internal grievance procedure: arbitra-
tion, as an appeals process, is unsuitable for sexual assault claims.165
The Sports Act’s arbitration requirement applies to disputes about
a participant’s membership in an NGB; questions pertaining to a
coach’s eligibility also trigger the arbitration requirement.166 In the
employment context, the U.S. Supreme Court has typically favored
arbitration as a means of solving disputes.167 Though arbitration
often provides efficient conflict resolution,168 there are some instances
where the employee’s interest in restitution substantially outweighs
the benefit of efficiency.169 For example, in Jones v. Halliburton Co.,
the court found that arbitration was an inappropriate dispute reso-
lution process because the workplace assault took place outside the
scope the plaintiff’s employment.170
159. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Little, Partner, Saeed & Little, LLP (Feb. 28,
2016).
160. See National Board of Review Committee, USA SWIMMING, http://www.usaswim
ming.org/ViewMiscArticle.aspx?TabId=1599&mid=6420&ItemId=3522 [http://perma.cc
/MH5ESN3Y].
161. Id.
162. Sturtz, supra note 7.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that sexual
harassment and assault is not within the scope of employment and therefore should not
be compelled to arbitration).
166. See 36 U.S.C.A. § 220522(a)(4)(B) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-218).
167. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983).
168. See George Padis, Note, Arbitration Under Siege: Reforming Consumer and Em-
ployment Arbitration and Class Actions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 665, 667 (2012).
169. Koplowitz, supra note 85, at 580.
170. Jones, 583 F.3d at 240.
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Given the traumatic nature of sexual assault, the court’s rea-
soning in Jones should apply to Olympic sports arbitration contexts.
Though an NGB, like an employer, will likely argue that an alleged
sexual assault by a coach should go to arbitration because it stems
from an athlete’s participation,171 that argument cuts against an
underlying assumption that sexual assault should not be an inher-
ent part of an athlete’s right to protected competition under the Sports
Act. Additionally, arbitration’s advantages for an employer or NGB
present challenges for a sexual assault victim seeking to appeal the
NGB’s decision to keep a coach in a sport. Such challenges include
greater privacy for the employer, enhanced settlement potential,
and lack of opportunity for appeal.172
The faulty mechanism for removing abusive coaches from sport,
coupled with a non-existent cause of action against NGBs, presents
serious issues for victims seeking retribution for abuse. Reviewing
the internal grievance process outlined above strongly suggests that
the USOC and its NGBs should not have the authority to self-police.
As the following subsection argues, there is too much incentive to
allow abusive coaches to remain in sports, without a cause of action
or independent investigatory body.
2. The Amateur Sports Act Lacks a Clear Cause of Action
That Would Provide Victims With the Legal Recourse to Sue
NGBs for Knowingly Retaining Abusive Coaches
Victims’ attorneys face two substantial issues when suing the
USOC and NGBs for coaching abuse: (1) unlike Title IX for student-
athletes, the Sports Act does not provide athletes a private right of
action,173 and (2) many NGBs have structured their insurance agree-
ments “to make them effectively judgment-proof.”174 These two issues
together mean that not only will the Sports Act, as currently ap-
plied, block an athlete’s state law claim against an NGB, but also
the NGB’s insurance policy likely deters lawyers from taking ath-
letes’ cases. This section will discuss both issues in order to show
how an NGB can preempt an athlete from obtaining any monetary
damages in a civil suit.
In DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Committee, the court held that the
Sports Act preempts state tort law, so athletes do not have an implied
171. See Koplowitz, supra note 85, at 580 (discussing employers’ views on why a sexual
assault claim should go through arbitration).
172. Id. at 569.
173. See Foschi v. U.S. Swimming, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 232, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); see also
Walton-Floyd v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 965 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. App. 1998).
174. Hogshead-Makar, supra note 14.
162 WILLIAM  & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 23:141
private cause of action against the USOC.175 To find a private cause
of action, the Supreme Court applies four factors:
(1) whether the plaintiff is a member of a class for whose special
benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is an indica-
tion of Congressional intent to create or deny a private remedy;
(3) whether a private remedy would be consistent with the stat-
ute’s underlying purposes; and (4) whether the cause of action
traditionally is relegated to state law.176
For the Sports Act, finding a private cause of action stops at the
second factor.177 Congress passed the Act to legislate the governance
structure of the USOC and its NGBs so governing disputes would
not harm athletes’ opportunity to compete.178 The DeFrantz court
pointed out that though the purpose of the Act—to enact governance
and facilitate participation—does protect an athlete’s ability to
compete, the USOC is a private organization, not a state actor, so
athletes receive no constitutional due process–like protections.179 In
other words, the Act will only recognize an athlete’s right to compete
if an internal dispute in the USOC’s governance structure infringes
upon participation.180
In addition to negating a private cause of action, courts defer to
the Sports Act dispute resolution process to rationalize a finding
that the Act preempts state tort law.181 The USOC would argue that
this rationalization makes sense, considering that the ability to
compete in the Olympic games is not a constitutionally protected
right.182 Because the Act “strongly favors athletes resolving their
disputes through the internal mechanisms provided by the USOC
rather than the judicial system,”183 courts are less likely to find a
private cause of action. Though later amendments to the Act in-
volved provisions for athletes’ disputes,184 they were not designed to
handle matters outside of an athlete’s eligibility complaint.185
175. DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1191 (D.D.C. 1980).
176. Walton-Floyd, 965 S.W.2d at 38.
177. Id.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 63–65; Walton-Floyd, 965 S.W.2d at 36.
179. DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1194.
180. Id. at 1191.
181. Walton-Floyd, 965 S.W.2d at 40.
182. Id. at 39.
183. Id. at 38.
184. Id.
185. The grievance procedure noted in this section for athletes under the 1998 amend-
ment of the Amateur Sports Act allows for athletes to appeal decisions made by the NGB
that directly affect their ability to compete, such as an NGB’s f inding that an athlete’s
doping violation makes him or her ineligible to compete in upcoming protected compe-
titions. See id. at 36.
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Current litigation surrounding the Gatt186 case illustrates the
issues athletes face when they do try to file suit. These obstacles are
rooted in both traditional tort concepts of negligence. First, in its
response to the plaintiff’s complaint, the USOC argues that, as a
matter of current law, it does not owe the plaintiffs a duty.187 As is
well-known, tort law does not interfere with private relationships to
which no legally cognizable duty attaches.188 Second, it is harder for
a plaintiff to demonstrate a principal/agent relationship in the
context of amateur athletics. In this case, the plaintiff would have
to make a showing of benefit between the USOC and Gitelman for
the operation of negligent liability for maintaining the coach’s sanc-
tioned status. The reason is that sexual torts, under state law, are
not within the “scope of employment.”189 Additionally, Gitelman was
not the USOC’s or USAT’s formal employee; he was only a sanc-
tioned member of USAT.190 Under the current regime, the USOC’s
response to the plaintiff’s suit is consistent with DeFrantz’s holding
that there is no private cause of action for an athlete to sue a sports
organization under state tort law.191
Analogizing the Sports Act with Title IX illuminates a legal void
where amateur athletes are not statutorily protected from sexual
abuse. Unlike the Sports Act, Title IX imputes a duty on schools to
thoroughly investigate sexual assault claims and take necessary
measures to prevent the reoccurrence of sexual assault on college
campuses.192 Additionally, there is a clear special relationship be-
tween students and school administrators; “special relationships”
such as those between students and teachers or doctors and patients
can impose a common law duty of care.193 Thus, in the event that a
school does not properly handle a sexual assault investigation, a
victim can hold the school liable.194 The stark differences in the way
Title IX and the Sports Act approach sexual assault are perplexing.
Both the USOC and educational institutions work closely with
186. See supra text accompanying note 168 (discussing current litigation pertaining
to the issue of suing an NGB for a coach’s sexual misconduct against minor athletes).
187. Answer at 2, Gatt v. USA Taekwondo, (Cal. Super. Ct. 2016) (No. BC599321).
188. See Walton-Floyd v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 965 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. App. 1998).
189. Answer, supra note 187, at 4–5.
190. Id.
191. DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1191 (D.D.C. 1980); see also
Martinez v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 802 F.2d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1986).
192. Ali, supra note 48, at 4.
193. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Duty Based on Special Relationship with Another
§ 40 (Am. Law Inst. 2016).
194. Ali, supra note 48, at 8 (discussing that schools are required to designate one
employee as a Title IX coordinator, and adopt and publish “grievance procedures pro-
viding for the prompt and equitable resolution of [student and employee] sex discrimina-
tion complaints”).
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vulnerable individuals. As the USOC oversees coach-athlete rela-
tionships where the athlete is at a clear power disadvantage, educa-
tional institutions supervise teacher-student relationships where a
similar power dynamic plays out for the student.195 Yet, the Sports
Act does not recognize a duty to plaintiffs filing private actions,196
so a legal void remains where there arguably should be a duty.197
Also blocking victims from obtaining monetary damages, some
NGB insurance policies exempt intentional torts, like sexual as-
sault, from general liability coverage.198 As recently as 2010, USA
Swimming, for example, maintained a captive insurance company
in Barbados, called the United States Sports Insurance Company
(USSIC).199 Paying premiums with membership dues in the 1980s
and 1990s, USA Swimming tailored its own policy and excluded sexual
misconduct from local swimming club policies.200 This policy changed
in the late 1990s, and sexual misconduct was reinstated on general
liability coverage.201 However, reinstating sexual misconduct did
little for victims; the NGB paid its defense lawyers large sums out
of the policy whenever athletes did sue, so athletes only received
minor damages, if at all.202
Though legal, captive insurance policies have recently raised
suspicion because parent entities can “custom tailor . . . policies
against risks that otherwise would not be covered under a standard
general liability policy, notably, coverage for sexual abuse.” 203 The
inherent issue with captive insurance companies is that standard
general liability policies do not intend to cover intentional acts,204
only negligent acts. The underlying truth to this set-up is that it is
impossible to negligently molest someone, so NGBs like USA Swim-
ming open themselves to accusations of concealing sexual abuse
taking place within their coaching association.205 Some states have
taken steps to ensure that organizations cannot abuse the captive
195. Compare United States Olympic Committee Coaching Ethics Code, supra note 27
(outlining the ethical standards used by the USOC to regulate the conduct of coaches
and thereby ensure the safety of athletes), with Ali, supra note 48, at 4 (explaining how
educational institutions must address and solve harassment issues both quickly and ef-
fectively in order to protect their students).
196. See DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1191 (D.D.C. 1980).
197. See infra text accompanying notes 252–60.
198. Hogshead-Makar, supra note 14.
199. Sturtz, supra note 7.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. John S. Carroll, Comment, Captive Insurance Companies and Sexual Abuse Policies,
84 UMKC L. REV. 211, 212 (2015).
204. Id. at 212–13.
205. Id. at 214.
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insurance system by tailoring their own policies.206 Until such efforts
become widespread, however, the captive insurance issue will continue
to work in conjunction with the Sports Act to keep victims from obtain-
ing meaningful damages for abuse.
III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
From an outside perspective, it may seem like sexual abuse in
Olympic club sports is systemic and intractable. NGBs acquire the
most elite coaches to turn amateur athletes into champions,207 and
it is within the NGBs’ best interest to retain these coaches, even if
some are abusive.208 As noted above, victim advocates explain that,
“[w]ithout enforcement . . . there’s little incentive to make change.
When someone sees something they think is inappropriate . . . they
fall back on their natural, human inclination to protect their own:
protect the coaches, protect their club, and protect their sport.” 209
This part will propose an approach for victim advocates to spur real
change within the USOC and NGB culture: incentives for appropri-
ate behavior in the sport realm, namely an independent investiga-
tory agency detached from the USOC’s influence and a real cause of
action that imposes civil liability on the USOC and NGBs.
A. Strengthen the National Center for Safe Sport As an
Independent Agency to Investigate NGBs and Coaches Implicated
in Athletes’ Sexual Assault Complaints
News outlets have picked up stories regarding Olympic coaching
sexual assault in recent years, and the USOC has found itself in a po-
sition where it must either respond or continue enduring criticism.210
In 2015, the USOC announced the formation of “an independent
advisory council to guide the launch of the United States Center for
Safe Sport.” 211 The announcement came after the USOC Safe Sport
Working Group submitted recommendations concerning athlete
welfare.212 The USOC intended the agency to “oversee education
programs for safe sport, and investigate and adjudicate claims of
206. Id. at 215–16, 229.
207. See Compl. for Damages, supra note 146, ¶¶ 14–15.
208. See Sturtz, supra note 7.
209. Id.
210. See Muchnick, supra note 24.
211. United States Olympic Committee, U.S. Olympic Committee Announces Formation
of U.S. Center for Safe Sport Advisory Council, TEAM USA (Feb. 9, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://
www.teamusa.org/News/2015/February/09/US-Olympic-Committee-Announces-Forma
tion-Of-US-Center-for-Safe-Sport-Advisory-Council [http://perma.cc/2XCMGUH8].
212. See Lopiano & Zotos, supra note 12, at 101–02.
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misconduct in sports that are managed by USOC-sanctioned National
Governing Bodies.” 213
Though USOC CEO Scott Blackmun conceded, “[t]here is no
national agency today that is responsible for the safety and well-
being of young athletes and we’re in position to lead this important
effort,” 214 the announcement did not come without criticism from
athlete advocates.215 On its face, the USOC’s announcement about
the new agency advances abuse victims’ rights, but there are substan-
tial concerns over its design.216 First, the USOC’s 2010 Safe Sport
program, which immediately preceded the USOC’s most recent estab-
lishment of an investigatory agency, contained outdated attitudes
toward coaching relationships, suggesting that the agency’s operation
would continue flawed operations against coaching sexual abuse.217
For example, Victor Vieth, executive director emeritus of the
Gundersen National Child Protection Training Center, pointed out
that in regards to appropriate coach-athlete relationships, many
leaders in the swimming community “struggle to see the harm in a
coach-athlete relationship as long as the athlete is an adult and
consents.” 218 Regardless of consent, the relationship is inappropriate
when there is an imbalance of power.219 Second, victim advocates
like Nancy Hogshead-Makar and Robert Allard question whether
the agency is truly independent, given that it was proposed and will
be operated by USOC officials.220 For this agency to be successful,
the USOC must take steps to make it truly independent.
1. The United States Anti-Doping Agency Serves As an
Appropriate Model for Creating an Independent Agency to
Investigate Sexual Abuse Claims
One way to make this agency truly independent is to model it
after the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA). In October
2000, Congress recognized the USADA as the “official anti-doping
organization for all Olympic, Paralympic, Pan American and Para
213. United States Olympic Committee, supra note 211.
214. Id.
215. Muchnick, supra note 24.
216. Id.
217. See Sturtz, supra note 7.
218. Victor Vieth, WHEN THE ATHLETE IS A CHILD: AN ASSESSMENT OF USA SWIMMING’S
SAFE SPORT PROGRAM, GUNDERSEN HEALTH, 14 (Jan. 27, 2014), https://swimswam.com
/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/USA-Swimming-Report-1-27-14.pdf.
219. Id.
220. Tom Goldman, USA Swimming Faces Lingering Doubts Over Sexual Abuse, NPR
(Aug. 27, 2013, 6:35 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/08/27/216188040
/usa-swimming-faces-lingering-doubts-over-sexual-abuse [http://perma.cc/45V795ER].
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Pan American sport in the United States.” 221 It is a non-profit, inde-
pendent organization that is operated by a Board of Directors, and
Congress granted it recognition as a result of the USOC’s Select
Task Force on Externalization “in order to bring credibility and inde-
pendence to the anti-doping in the U.S.” 222 Today, the agency has
authority to execute a national anti-doping program, which includes
“testing, adjudication, education, and research.” 223 It also develops
programs, policies, and procedures related to athletic doping.224
Athlete advocates are divided on whether the USADA would
serve as an adequate model for a sexual abuse investigatory agency.
Irvin Muchnick,225 a journalist who has spent years documenting
the stories of sexually abusive coaches, questions the USADA’s inde-
pendence, especially while Travis Tygart serves as the USADA’s
CEP.226 Before serving the USADA, Tygart worked for Holme Rob-
erts & Owen LLP (now merged with Bryan Cave LLP), a firm repre-
senting the USOC on sexual assault matters.227 Tygart himself worked
on a rotation of lawyers that communicated with private investiga-
tors following up on complaints of abuse or molestation by USA
Swimming members.228 Muchnick’s concerns are indicative of the
underlying argument against using the USADA as a model for the
new investigatory agency: those in Board positions at the USADA
that were once affiliated with the USOC may mean that the USADA
is not truly independent, and thus should not serve as a model for
a new investigatory agency.229
Other advocates believe that the USADA could serve as an effec-
tive model, citing its proclaimed independence and effectiveness.230
One advocate is Nancy Hogshead-Makar, who Muchnick calls “one of
the country’s longest and strongest advocates on behalf of female
athletes’ rights.” 231 She states that the USADA is effective and in-
dependent enough to serve as a model for the new agency.232 Her
221. USADA, http://www.usada.org/about/independence-history [http://perma.cc/J2QE
NNKM].
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Irvin Muchnick is known for his sports journalism, having published numerous
articles in The New York Times and Sports Illustrated. See About Irvin Muchnick,
CONCUSSION.INC, http://concussioninc.net/?page_id=2 [http://perma.cc/5ALKV5K6].
226. Irvin Muchnick, EXCLUSIVE: Travis Tygart, Head of Olympic Anti-Doping
Agency, Investigated Sexual Abuse Cases for USA Swimming, CONCUSSION.INC (Sept. 3,
2014), http://concussioninc.net/?p=9419 [http://perma.cc/3LMJNGQS].
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228. Id.
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230. Muchnick, supra note 24.
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claim regarding the USADA’s independence is corroborated by the
fact that the USADA’s Board has fewer representatives from the
USOC than it did at its founding.233 At least the remaining USOC
influence on the USADA comes from the NGB Council and USOC
Athlete Advisory Council,234 where athletes have some influence
pursuant to the Sports Act.235
Despite Tygart’s past involvement with sexual abuse investiga-
tions, the USDA’s effectiveness and legal framework are perhaps
better indicators of whether it would serve as an appropriate model
for the new agency. Before the USADA existed, the U.S. Olympic
Team had the National Anti-Doping Program (NADP) that was sub-
ject to international criticism about its independence from USOC.236
During Congressional hearings, Senator John McCain threatened
to strip the USOC’s autonomy over American Olympic sports, “if the
Olympic Movement did not develop a serious, independent, and
transparent anti-doping program.” 237 Even the International Olym-
pic Committee (IOC), which backed criticism of the USOC’s alleged
conflict of interest with the NADP, helped set up the World Anti-
Doping Agency (WADA) and its domestic counterpart: the USADA,238
thus suggesting that the USADA is independent enough while em-
ploying a few individuals affiliated with the USOC.
Given the U.S.’s historical reputation as a “dirty” nation when it
comes to doping, the USADA has made numerous enforcement strides
to remedy this perception,239 making its endeavor to combat doping
in Olympic sports effective. When the USADA adopted the WADA
code, it meant that the agency’s burden of proof lessened from beyond
a reasonable doubt to comfortable satisfaction.240 This lightened
standard has raised concerns, especially because the consequences
for positive drug tests are so strong for athletes.241 Though commenta-
tors point out that this is an issue for athletes’ rights, the USADA’s
independence coupled with how fiercely it investigates doping allega-
tions may inform the USOC’s new investigatory agency for coaching
233. USADA, supra note 221.
234. Id.
235. See 36 U.S.C.S. § 220504(b)(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-118).
236. Doriane Lambelet Coleman & James E. Coleman, Jr., The Problem of Doping, 57
DUKE L.J. 1743, 1744 (2008).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Laura S. Stewart, Comment, Has the United States Anti-Doping Agency Gone Too
Far? Analyzing the Shift from “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” to “Comfortable Satisfaction,”
13 VILL. SPORTS & ENTM’T L.J. 207, 225 (2006).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 222–23 (stating that there is a two-year suspension for first serious violations
and lifetime bans for second violations, but also noting that the rules for accidental doping
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sexual assault complaints. Once established, the USOC must detach
itself from the United States Center for Safe Sport like it did, for the
most part, with the USADA so that the new agency does not have a
conflict of interest when it comes to safeguarding abusive coaches.242
B. Carve Out an Effective Cause of Action Under the Sports Act So
That Victims Can Sue NGBs in Civil Court and Receive
Appropriate Damages for Coaching Sexual Abuse
As noted before, the Sports Act preempts state tort law, thus
eliminating the USOC’s and NGBs’ explicit duties to athletes in pri-
vate actions.243 However, as this section argues, the Sports Act con-
tains an implied duty to athletes by instilling the USOC and NGBs
with complete authority to regulate and oversee the administration
of American Olympic teams.244 The Act also defines an amateur
athlete as an athlete that passes the eligibility standards set forth
by the NGB representing her sport.245 By granting the NGB author-
ity to determine an athlete’s eligibility, the Sports Act authorizes
the NGB to serve that athlete’s needs,246 thus creating a special
relationship between the NGB and the athlete in theory.247 This
subsection argues that a duty for the USOC and the NGBs to prop-
erly oversee and maintain a safe sporting environment follows from
that special relationship. Breaching that duty by failing to check the
coach’s background or not thoroughly investigating sexual abuse
claims would be akin to per se negligence and entitle a victim to
damages in a private cause of action.
1. The Sports Act’s Imputation of Duty on NGBs to Maintain
a Safe Sporting Environment Hinges on Membership Within
the USOC
The Sports Act created the USOC as a private corporation,248 but
the USOC and its NGBs do not retain coaches through employment
242. Analogies made between the USADA and the United States Center for Safe Sport
are merely this author’s suggestions and optimistic projections for a hopefully successful
investigatory agency. Since announcing this news in 2015, the USOC has stumbled at
least once. By June of that year, it missed its deadline of launching a $5.2 million start-
up phase. Only time will tell if the agency is truly analogous to the independence and
effectiveness found in the USADA. See Muchnick, supra note 24.
243. See DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1191 (D.D.C. 1980).
244. 36 U.S.C.S. § 220503(3)(A) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
245. 36 U.S.C.S. § 220501(b)(1) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-218).
246. See id.
247. Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def. USA Gymnastics, Inc.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 15,
Jane Doe v. USA Gymnastics, Inc., No. ST13CV058RT (Ga. Cir. Ct. 2016).
248. 36 U.S.C.S. § 220501(b)(4) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-218).
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contracts.249 Rather, they are retained and sanctioned on a member-
ship basis within the coaching association.250 The USOC and NGBs
argue that they are not liable for a member coach’s actions since
there are no employment contracts binding the two entities to-
gether.251 However, the Sports Act imposes several requirements,
such as athlete welfare policy, on NGBs to uphold in order to main-
tain private corporate status.252 As such, implied duties attach when
coaches are operating in conjunction with NGB requirements.
First, an NGB’s policies invoke a duty of care in relation to the
athlete’s welfare within the sport. Under the title “General duties
of national governing bodies,” the Sports Act requires an NGB to:
keep amateur athletes informed of policy matters and reasonably
reflect the views of the athletes in its policy decisions; [and] . . .
disseminate and distribute to amateur athletes, coaches, trainers,
managers, administrators, and officials in a timely manner the
applicable rules and any changes to such rules of the national
governing body. . . .253
Formulating policy in the athletes’ favor under this requirement
attaches a duty to uphold the policy.254 For example, the USOC bans
romantic coach-athlete relationships255 and drafts policy to “safeguard
the well-being of persons for whom [coaches] are responsible.”256 From
this policy, athletes would likely assume that the USOC does enforce
a safe environment, and athletes’ reliance on this policy should invoke
a duty pursuant to the theory of undertakings.
Second, NGB bylaws attach a duty to investigate its members’
infractions. The Sports Act requires NGBs to provide equal opportu-
nities to amateur athletes and coaches “without discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, age, or national origin . . . .” 257
This provision authorizes the NGBs to create bylaws that would
regulate members’ behavior in relation to the anti-discrimination
policy. A member’s violation of the bylaw implicates the Sports Act’s
anti-discrimination provision, and such violation could be grounds
249. Hogshead-Makar, supra note 14.
250. Id.
251. Notice of Dem. at 4–5, Gatt v. USA Taekwondo, No. BC599321 (Cal. Super. Ct.
2015).
252. 36 U.S.C.A. § 220524 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
253. Id.
254. See Ali, supra note 48, at 3–5, 9 (imputing a duty to schools by requiring specific
procedures to investigate sexual assault claims).
255. See United States Olympic Committee Coaching Ethics Code, supra note 27.
256. Hogshead-Makar, supra note 32.
257. 36 U.S.C.A. § 220522 (a)(8)(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-218).
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for termination.258 With this consequence, a duty does attach to NGBs
through which they must investigate sexual abuse claims because
they mandate action in accordance with anti-discrimination, so they
should also be the entities that enforce it.
2. There Is a Strong Proximate Cause Connection Between
an NGB’s Breach of the Sports Act’s Implied Duty and a
Victim’s Damages
As the above section shows, the Sports Act contains an implied
duty for the USOC and NGBs to establish a safe environment for
training and a thorough investigatory process for sexual abuse com-
plaints. This subsection intends to illustrate that when an NGB
fails to thoroughly investigate a claim, it not only breaches the duty
described above, but it also detracts from the safe environment it
purports to maintain. There are three theories linking an NGB’s
breach to the in-fact and proximate causation of a victim’s damages:
(1) when an NGB is on notice that sexual abuse has taken place
within its facilities and takes no subsequent preventative measure,
future abuse is foreseeable, (2) when a coach has been reported and
an NGB takes no action, future abuse is also foreseeable, and (3) when
an NGB fails to properly screen a coach before allowing him to coach
minor athletes or fails to oversee him while with athletes, the oppor-
tunity for abuse becomes more likely than not.259
In Gatt v. USA Taekwondo, the plaintiffs demonstrated how the
USOC and its NGBs were on notice to the prevalence of sexual abuse
within Olympic facilities.260 In that case, the plaintiffs used USA
Taekwondo’s riddled history with coach-inflicted sexual abuse to
illustrate how an NGB’s breach of the implied duties was the proxi-
mate cause of a victim’s damages.261 The USOC took insufficient
steps in responding to a reported rape,262 and consequently, Gatt
and her fellow plaintiffs came in contact with their abusive coach,
Marc Gitelman, just a few years later.263 The underlying argument
here is that if the USOC had taken proper precautionary measures to
respond to sexual abuse complaints and prevent their recurrence,
the current plaintiffs would have been free from damage.
258. See id.
259. See Compl. for Damages, supra note 146, ¶¶ 34–35.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 147–50 (discussing how the USOC was on
notice about rape occurring within facilities and only placed a guard at facilities—only
to remove him from his post a few years later).
263. Compl. for Damages, supra note 146, ¶¶ 21–22.
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Additionally, when a coach is shown to have been an abuser, an
NGB’s failure to remove him from coaching or properly screen him
before allowing him to coach elsewhere suggests the NGB should
reasonably foresee repeat abusive behavior. For example, in a 2011
club swimming case, USA Swimming retained Christopher Wheat,
a coach for a club swim team, despite his having been forced out of
coaching for sexually abusing minor athletes several years prior.264
By 2009, Wheat was coaching minors again and sexually abused one
of his female athletes before her father filed suit against USA
Swimming in 2011.265 The coach’s actions in 2009 support the legal
causation argument that would hold USA Swimming liable. The
NGB’s failure to permanently ban Wheat in the early 2000s, coupled
with the NGB’s negligent retention of Wheat, made it more likely
that the plaintiff would be molested in 2009 and suffer emotional
and psychological damages, and such abuse was reasonably foresee-
able from falling below the standard of care.266
On a final note, analogizing the Sports Act’s implied duty with
Title IX’s duty reinforces why Congress should carve out a private
cause of action for amateur athletes to sue NGBs in civil court. Just
like schools have a duty, pursuant to the DCL, to investigate and
take proper steps to prevent sexual assault on campus,267 so should
the USOC and its NGBs have a duty to uphold the integrity of safe
sporting environments. In both contexts, duty attaches because the
overseeing institution is in the position of authority to create and
enforce policy.268 Without enforcing or even creating policy, it is
reasonably likely that abuse can occur, especially in relationships
where one individual has authority over the other.269
Additionally, just as schools must investigate sexual assault
complaints,270 NGB bylaws and policies imply that such investiga-
tions will take place,271 which means that, at some point, someone
264. Compl. at 4, Jane Doe v. USA Swimming, No. 49D11-11-11-07-43440 (no date).
265. Id.
266. See id. at 9.
267. Ali, supra note 48, at 3–4.
268. See id. at 7.
269. As this Note has assumed throughout this writing, there is an obvious power dy-
namic between coach and athlete, one that should immediately prompt protection for the
athlete. See Ali, supra note 48, at 6 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b)) (discussing that schools are
required to publish “grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution
of student and employee sex discrimination complaints.” From the DCL, this writer infers
such procedures are in place because relationships where there is a power dynamic present
opportunities for abuse. Such inference can also be applied to coaching relationships).
270. Id. at 3–4.
271. See 36 U.S.C.A. § 220522 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-218) (requires NGBs
to publish bylaws so that they uphold the Sports Act’s anti-discrimination provision).
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in the NGB recognized the possibility that sexual abuse has occurred
and should be properly addressed. Pursuant to Title IX, failing to
investigate a sexual assault complaint gives a student the right to
either file an administrative complaint with the OCR (not the school)
or a private action that alleges the school’s disregard for her com-
plaint.272 As this part has demonstrated, the inherent duty that the
Sports Act bestows on the USOC and its NGBs implicates a cause
of action that should be available for plaintiff athletes. Without one,
there is no effective legal recourse that athletes can pursue against
their NGBs like students can pursue, for similar reasons, against
their schools.
CONCLUSION
Coach-inflicted sexual abuse in Olympic sports has developed
into a critical legal issue for several reasons. First, the USOC’s
policies toward inappropriate coach-athlete relationships are frag-
mented and limited in their application; NGBs are only required to
adopt the most basic athlete welfare policies proposed by the USOC.
Even when they do, these policies do not apply to all NGB-affiliated
athletes and coaches, only the athletes chosen for Team USA and
NGB employees. Coaches operating in club teams, though still NGB
members, are outliers, as evidenced by Anna Strzempko’s story and
her swim team’s affiliation with USA Swimming.
Second, the Amateur Sports Act does not offer a concrete legal
framework designed to address issues of sexual assault and abuse
taking place within Olympic Sports. Victim-athletes seeking to re-
move their abusers from sports are funneled through USOC and the
NGB, usually by an arbitration clause that was not designed to
handle sexual assault claims. Meanwhile, the Sports Act preempts
state tort law and eliminates private causes of action against USOC.
Without an incentive to remove abusive individuals from sport,
many young athletes, mostly female, are left without clear legal
recourse as they either struggle through their athletic careers or
give up on those careers as a result of ongoing abuse. As a matter of
civil rights, these female athletes deserve either an agency outside
of the USOC to address sexual assault complaints or a cause of
action to obtain damages so that they can vindicate their claims.
Ideally, they should have both in order to effectively sue and remove
the coaches for future athletes’ safety.
272. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUID-
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Aside from the legal questions raised in this Note, the issue
underscores other questions beyond its scope that other academic
disciplines should answer. For example, research into why the sexual
abuse that is plaguing Olympic sports has not been given more na-
tional attention would also be productive. This Note largely derives
its supplemental research from a handful of news articles and recent
victims’ pleadings obtained from the few attorneys currently con-
fronting the legal thicket. Coaches abusing their minor, elite, female
athletes have not made national headlines like Jerry Sandusky and
Joe Paterno did in the Pennsylvania State football scandal.273 This
phenomenon begs the question of whether, “we feel an automatic dis-
gust toward stories like Sandusky’s, one that doesn’t always carry
over to heterosexual crimes committed against teenage girls.” 274
Maybe the first step to serving justice and garnering more public
recognition took place when Chuck Wielgus, the symbol of one of
the largest Olympic sex abuse cover-ups, removed himself from his
International Swimming Hall of Fame nomination. However, this
only occurred as a result of ardent efforts by the Women’s Sports
Foundation and athletes brave enough to come forward with their
stories. For lasting justice to emerge, changes must be made to the
legal system in the form of an independent agency and a real cause
of action for athletes. Until then, abusive coaches, not athletes, are
safe in sports.
HALEY O. MORTON*
273. See Malcolm Gladwell, In Plain View, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 24, 2012), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/09/24/in-plain-view [http://perma.cc/6RDY22RG].
274. Sturtz, supra note 7.
* J.D. Candidate 2017, William & Mary School of Law; B.A. 2014 Political Science
and History, Principia College. The author would like to thank Nancy Hogshead-Makar
and Jonathan Little, Saeed & Little, LLP for their guidance and mentorship.
